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NOTE 
Reinforcing Autonomy: Legal Ethics and 
Constitutional Compliance in Indigent 
Criminal Defense 
McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). 
George R. Brand* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Regulating the judicial system is an inherently difficult task.  With multi-
ple stakeholder groups often at odds with each other and within themselves, it 
is almost impossible to create laws, rules, and norms that satisfy everyone.  The 
unnervingly peculiar capital murder case of McCoy v. Louisiana typifies the 
many competing ideologies and motivations constantly in flux in the American 
judicial system.1  While unique idiosyncrasies within this case frame a series 
of events unlikely to be repeated, the Supreme Court of the United States’ split 
decision educes this ongoing debate amongst judges, litigants, and legislatures 
on the best practices and purposes undergirding the entire judicial system.2  
This improbable, upsetting, and downright odd outlier case wields implications 
for constitutional interpretation, legal ethics, indigent criminal defendants, and 
the philosophy of the judicial system at large. 
The beginning of this Note first distinguish the conflicting motivations of 
the varying stakeholders in the questions posed by this case and trace applica-
ble legal doctrines back to their foundational roots.  Next, the middle will strat-
ify the ongoing ethical debate pinpointed by this case and propose a potential 
middle ground solution that might provide limited satisfaction for both sides. 
Lastly, the end will remark on a glaring atrocity left by the practical application 
of this case and issue a call to action to prevent similar shortcomings in the 
future. 
  
* B.A., St. Olaf College, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 
2019; Crosby M.B.A. Candidate, University of Missouri Trulaske College of Business, 
2019; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2018-2019.  I wish to thank my faculty 
advisor, Professor Larry Dessem, for his generous research assistance and support.  I 
am also grateful to the Missouri Law Review staff for their help and encouragement 
during the editorial process. 
 1. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). 
 2. See id.  
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
McCoy v. Louisiana is an appeal from defendant Robert McCoy, who was 
sentenced to death after being convicted of three counts of first-degree murder 
in Louisiana state court.3  McCoy sought a new trial on the grounds of Sixth 
Amendment violations stemming from structural error committed by his for-
mer attorney, Larry English.4 
McCoy was accused of shooting and killing Christine Colston, Willie 
Young, and Gregory Colston on May 5, 2008 in Bossier City, Louisiana.5  
These three victims were the mother, stepfather, and son (from a different fa-
ther), respectively, of McCoy’s ex-wife, Yolanda Colston.6  McCoy and 
Yolanda had recently separated less than a month before the murder after a 
domestic dispute in which she claimed he “pinned her down on the bed at knife-
point and threatened to kill her and then kill himself.”7  McCoy was issued an 
arrest warrant for aggravated battery after this incident, and he failed to show 
up to work and fled to California in an effort to evade arrest.8  McCoy returned 
from California the day before the murder took place.9  The murder took place 
at Yolanda’s parents’ house, where Gregory also lived while finishing up his 
senior year in high school.10   
A tremendous amount of evidence linked McCoy to the murders of his 
three ex-family members.11  A 911 call from the scene of the murder detailed 
Christine Colston screaming, “She ain’t here, Robert . . . I don’t know where 
she is.  The detectives have her.  Talk to the detectives.  She ain’t in there, 
Robert,” before a gunshot was fired and the call was disconnected.12  “She” 
was presumably referencing McCoy’s estranged wife, Yolanda, who had re-
cently entered protective custody out-of-state, along with her infant child (from 
a different father) in the wake of McCoy’s recent aggravated battery arrest.13  
When police officers arrived at the murder scene, dashboard video footage rec-
orded a car registered to McCoy fleeing the scene.14  The footage also recorded 
a black male matching McCoy’s physical description jump out of the driver’s 
side of the car, abandon the car, scale a fence, and run away across a busy 
highway.15 
  
 3. State v. McCoy, 218 So.3d 535, 541 (La. 2018). 
 4. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. at 1507. 
 5. Id. at 1505–06.  
 6. State v. McCoy, 218 So.3d at 541. 
 7. Id. at 541 n.2. 
 8. Id. at 541. 
 9.  Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 541–44. 
 12. Id. at 541–42. 
 13. Id. at 541. 
 14. Id. at 542. 
 15. Id.  
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The cordless telephone used to make the 911 call was found inside the 
car.16  Police suspected McCoy took the phone out of the house with him after 
Christine used it to call 911.17  Also found inside the car were a Walmart bag 
with a box of .380-caliber ammunition (the same caliber used in the murders) 
and a Walmart cash receipt dating the purchase of the ammunition as earlier 
that same day.18  Walmart video surveillance footage recorded a person match-
ing McCoy’s physical description making the ammunition purchase at the same 
time shown on the ammunition receipt.19  Finally, a friend of McCoy testified 
that McCoy had asked her to buy bullets for him, or to at least loan him money 
for the bullets.20  After refusing both requests, she agreed to accompany McCoy 
to Walmart, and he went into the store and bought the bullets himself.21 
Five days after the murders took place, police apprehended McCoy at a 
truck stop in Lewiston, Idaho.22  He had hitchhiked with truck drivers across 
the United States.23  McCoy was carrying a pay stub, birth certificate, social 
security card, insurance cards, credit cards, and identification cards.24  Most 
importantly, McCoy also had a loaded handgun on the floor behind the passen-
ger seat of the truck he was riding in.25  A firearms examiner concluded at trial 
that all four bullets used during the triple homicide were fired from the gun 
McCoy had when he was apprehended in Idaho.26  While in custody and await-
ing extradition to Louisiana, McCoy unsuccessfully tried to hang himself with 
a bed sheet.27  McCoy was finally returned to Louisiana two days after the bed 
sheet incident and nine days after the murders took place.28 
Despite the overwhelming amount of evidence to the contrary, McCoy 
has constantly asserted his innocence over the eleven years since the incident 
took place.29  After a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist concluded McCoy 
was competent to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his 
defense,30 he originally proceeded with the assistance of an appointed public 
  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 542, n.3. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 543.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 544.  
 25. Id. at 543–44. 
 26. Id. at 544 n.8. 
 27. Id. at 544.  
 28. Id.  
 29. See generally McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). 
 30. The sanity commission determined McCoy had a full-scale IQ of 89. State v. 
McCoy, 218 So.3d at 544 n.9.  His verbal IQ was 95, and his performance IQ was 83. 
Id.  These metrics did not meet the codified Louisiana definition for mental retardation 
or intellectual disability. Id.  
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defender.31  McCoy later fired the public defender and represented himself pro 
se until his parents hired attorney Larry English to represent him on March 1, 
2010.32  Although English had previous criminal defense experience, he had 
never represented a client facing the death penalty and was not certified to try 
death penalty cases.33  The court made sure McCoy understood his attorney 
was not certified to try death penalty cases and obtained McCoy’s consent be-
fore letting English commence representation.34  English successfully peti-
tioned the court to delay the trial for a year in order to give him more time to 
find assistance (from the same public defender’s office that McCoy had previ-
ously fired) to present McCoy’s defense.35 
Throughout the case, McCoy’s defense was that the court, prosecutors, 
police officers, and English were all part of an elaborate scheme to frame him 
for the triple homicide and cover up an intricate drug-running ring in which 
they were all co-conspirators.36  He had no evidence for any of these theories, 
and a clinical psychologist testified that McCoy “is one of those people that 
can lie to themselves so extensively and for such a long period of time that they 
ultimately end up believing what the lie is.”37 
In preparation for trial, English advised McCoy to plead guilty in hopes 
of obtaining a lesser conviction and avoiding a death sentence.38  However, it 
was not until two weeks before trial that English definitively told McCoy that 
he intended to confess McCoy’s guilt to the jury even though McCoy wanted 
to plead innocent to the charged crimes.39  Two days before the trial was sched-
uled to commence, English told the court he had just learned that McCoy 
wanted to fire him as his counsel.40  McCoy claimed his parents had retained 
two new attorneys to take over his representation, although the new attorneys 
were not at the hearing and McCoy did not even know their names.41  With the 
trial only two days away – having now been over three years since the murders 
took place – the trial judge refused to let English withdraw and ordered him to 
continue representing McCoy at trial.42 
English followed through with the planned guilty plea even though it was 
against McCoy’s wishes.43  He admitted McCoy’s guilt in his opening state-
ment, saying, “I’m telling you Mr. McCoy committed these crimes, [but he 
  
 31. Id. at 544.  
 32. Id. at 545.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 545–46.  
 36. Id. at 549 n.15. 
 37. Id. at 550 n.16. 
 38. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1506 n.2 (2018). 
 39. Id.  
 40. State v. McCoy, 218 So.3d at 548. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 549.  
 43. Id.  
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suffers from] serious emotional issues [that impair his ability] to function in 
society and to make rational decisions.”44  English asked the jury to consider 
the case as a second-degree murder trial in hopes of saving McCoy from the 
death penalty charge that might accompany a first-degree murder conviction.45  
Against English’s advice and wishes, McCoy insisted on testifying in his own 
defense and presented his elaborate alibi defense at trial.46  The jury returned a 
unanimous verdict finding McCoy guilty as charged on all three counts of first-
degree murder, and, at the penalty phase, sentenced him to death after hearing 
victim impact statements from McCoy’s ex-wife, Yolanda, other friends and 
relatives of the deceased, and a mitigation plea from the clinical psychologist 
who previously conducted McCoy’s sanity commission.47 
Four months after being sentenced to death, attorneys from the Louisiana 
Capital Assistance Center filed a motion for a new trial on behalf of McCoy.48  
McCoy’s appellate attorneys also filed several motions for a new trial and ap-
pealed the death sentence conviction based on sixteen alleged assignments of 
error.49  The main thrust of the appellate argument was that McCoy was irrep-
arably wronged when English admitted his client’s guilt (in an effort to reduce 
his client’s conviction from first to second-degree murder) because English 
knew his client wanted to plead innocent to the charged crimes.50  The Supreme 
Court of Louisiana ruled against McCoy and issued an opinion on October 19, 
2016 that affirmed the lower court’s decision and McCoy’s death sentence or-
der.51 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard the case in 
January 2018.52  On May 14, 2018, the Court reversed the decision of the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana and ordered a new trial for McCoy based on Eng-
lish’s structural error in admitting McCoy’s guilt when his client wanted to 
plead innocent.53  Rather than focusing on English’s professional conduct and 
punishing the attorney for his actions, the Court tried to determine whether 
McCoy had suffered irreparable harm worthy of a new trial.54  Justice Ginsburg 
wrote the majority opinion and was joined by five other justices.55  Justice Alito 
  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 550.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 550–51.  
 50. Id.  
 51. See generally State v. McCoy, 218 So.3d 535 (La. 2018). 
 52. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). 
 53. Id. at 1512.  
 54. Id. at 1511–12.  
 55. Id. at 1504–05.  
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filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Gor-
such.56  In her majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the Sixth Amend-
ment gives defendants “the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting 
guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt of-
fers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty.”57 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A dense background of cases and rules are germane to the ethical issues 
posed in McCoy.  The starting point is the Sixth Amendment, which requires 
that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”58 
The United States Supreme Court has heard several cases over the years 
in which it has attempted to define and qualify exactly what protections the 
Sixth Amendment provides to criminal defendants.  Perhaps the earliest of 
these cases was Brookhart v. Janis, in which an able-minded criminal attorney 
waived his client’s rights to cross-examine witnesses even though the client did 
not consent to the waiver beforehand and did not intend to plead guilty.59  
While the attorney in Brookhart did not actually enter a guilty plea, the Court 
determined the attorney’s conduct and actions effectively amounted to a guilty 
plea because of the irreversible harm caused by defending oneself without the 
ability to cross-examine witnesses at trial.60  The Court in Brookhart held the 
attorney did not have “power to enter a plea which is inconsistent with his cli-
ent’s expressed desire and thereby waive his client’s constitutional right to 
plead not guilty.”61 
The conclusion reached in Brookhart rests on the well-known rule of law 
explicitly codified in 1983 by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:  
A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives 
of representation and . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by 
the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to 
be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will tes-
tify.62   
  
 56. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 57. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. at 1505. 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 59. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). 
 60. Id. at 7–8.  
 61. Id. at 7.  
 62. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).  While this 
rule traditionally holds that lawyers are allowed to make tactical decisions as long as 
clients make the fundamental ones, McCoy presents a perfect example of the Court 
making amendments to this overly-simplistic rule that Justice Scalia called “vague and 
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However, Brookhart and its progeny assert that defense attorneys cannot 
undertake actions that effectively, although not explicitly, surmount to entering 
a plea decision adverse to their client’s wishes.63 
In the same vein as Brookhart, the 1975 watershed case Faretta v. Cali-
fornia strengthened a criminal defendant’s rights to control his own case.64  The 
Court in Faretta affirmed that able-minded criminal defendants held rights to 
proceed pro se, and Justice Stewart’s lengthy majority opinion included several 
paragraphs outlining the intentions and practical applications of the Sixth 
Amendment.65  He commented on the balance of power between criminal de-
fendants and counselors in writing, “The right to defend is given directly to the 
accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails . . . [The 
Sixth Amendment] speaks of the ‘assistance’ of counsel, and an assistant, how-
ever expert, is still an assistant.”66  The Court in Faretta announced that able-
minded criminal defendants effectively captain the ship in defending them-
selves in a lawsuit even though their attorney, if present, can serve as a valued 
and trusted first mate.67 
Justice Stewart went on to write “The language and spirit of the Sixth 
Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed 
by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant – not an organ of the 
State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend him-
self personally.”68  Faretta determined that the Sixth Amendment’s promise of 
“Assistance of Counsel for his defence” meant that able-minded criminal de-
fendants were free to decline counsel altogether and that, if present, criminal 
defense attorneys owed duties to abide by their client’s wishes and nothing 
else.69 
Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in Faretta, which Justices 
Burger and Rehnquist also joined.70  The dissent disagreed that able-minded 
criminal defendants should be able to represent themselves unassisted by coun-
sel in all cases under any circumstances.71  While the dissent acknowledged 
that the Sixth Amendment should not allow counsel to co-opt defendants from 
  
derive[ing] from nothing more substantial than this court’s say-so.” See Steven Zeid-
man, ‘McCoy v. Louisiana’: Whose Case is it Anyway?, N.Y. L. J. (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/newyorklawjour-
nal/2018/01/19/mccoy-v-louisiana-whose-case-is-it-anyway/?slre-
turn=20190308034418 [perma.cc/SN7D-UQ4A] (citing Gonzalez v. United States, 553 
U.S. 242, 256 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 63. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 
175, 187–89 (2004); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 250–51 (2008). 
 64. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 65. Id. at 819–36.  
 66. Id. at 819–20.  
 67. Id. at 806.  
 68. Id. at 820.  
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820. 
 70. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 846–52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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mounting their own defense, Justice Blackmun feared that giving able-minded 
criminal defendants so much agency might lead them to ignore good intentions 
from appointed counsel and end up worse off than they would have been if 
counsel had more control.72 
Two previous cases heard in state courts were factually similar to McCoy, 
and both cases reached similar outcomes.73  In State v. Carter, the defendant 
was originally charged with both first-degree murder and felony murder.74  Alt-
hough Carter wanted to plead innocent to all charges, his attorney admitted his 
client was guilty on the felony murder charge and only defended his client’s 
innocence on the first-degree murder charge.75  The Kansas Supreme Court 
ultimately granted Carter a new trial because the lawyer’s conduct “not only 
denied Carter the right to conduct his defense, but, as in Brookhart, it was the 
equivalent to entering a plea of guilty.”76 
In Cooke v. State, a defense attorney attempted to defend his client’s 
charges by arguing his client was “guilty but mentally ill” even though the cli-
ent wanted to plead not guilty to all charges.77  The Delaware Supreme Court 
held that the defense attorney’s conduct unfairly infringed his client’s right to 
plead not guilty, negated his right to testify in his own defense, and deprived 
him of his right to an impartial jury trial.78  As in Carter, the court in Cooke 
granted the defendant a new trial in light of the violations of the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment rights.79 
However, the mere fact that defense attorneys act without their client’s 
consent does not, in and of itself, warrant a new trial.  Three different federal 
circuit courts in cases factually similar to McCoy found Sixth Amendment vi-
olations but did not grant new trials or rule in favor of defendants because of a 
lack of prejudicial effect.80  A key distinction between these cases and McCoy 
is that the former were reviewed through a challenge of ineffective assistance 
of counsel – which triggered the prejudicial error requirement – while McCoy 
was reviewed under a lens focused on defendant autonomy that did not require 
a finding of prejudicial error in order to grant a new trial.81 
  
 72. Id. at 849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that there is anything in 
the Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment that requires the States to subordinate 
the solemn business of conducting a criminal prosecution to the whimsical – albeit vol-
untary – caprice of every accused who wishes to use his trial as a vehicle for personal 
or political self-gratification.”). 
 73. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1145 (Kan. 2000); Cooke v. State, 977 
A.2d 803, 842 (Del. 2009). 
 74. Carter, 14 P.3d at 1141. 
 75. Id. at 1143.  
 76. Id. at 1148.  
 77. Cooke, 977 A.2d at 809. 
 78. Id. at 842–46. 
 79. Id. at 857.  
 80. Carter, 14 P.3d at 1148; Cooke, 977 A.2d at 857. 
 81. See Jay Schweikert, Victory for Defendant Autonomy and the Criminal Jury 
Trial in McCoy v. Louisiana, CATO INST. (May 14, 2018), 
 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/9
2019] CRIMINAL DEFENSE 1103 
Federal circuit courts have also heard similar cases where attorneys acted 
contrary to their clients’ wishes. In United States. v. Holman, a defendant was 
convicted by a jury of three separate crimes: possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute, possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon, and carrying 
a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.82  Without consult-
ing his client or explaining the trial strategy beforehand, the defense attorney 
conceded that his client possessed cocaine, but denied his client’s guilt as to 
the other crimes charged.83  Although the court held that the attorney’s conduct 
violated his client’s Sixth Amendment rights, the court found these violations 
were unprejudicial.84  The court affirmed the ruling that there was not “a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”85 
In Haynes v. Cain, a defense attorney pleaded guilty, without his client’s 
consent, to a second-degree murder charge in order to prevent his client from 
receiving the death penalty, which was possible if he was convicted on first-
degree murder.86  The defendant was later denied a new hearing when he ar-
gued his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by his attorney’s conduct be-
cause he could not show these violations resulted in prejudicial effect.87 
A finding of prejudicial effect is the key distinction between harmless and 
structural error findings.  Errors that do not affect substantial rights and lack 
“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” 
are likely to be deemed harmless error and will not, in and of themselves, cause 
judges to order cases be retried.88  Structural error, however, are those that af-
fect “the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end.”89  These types of 
errors affect “the framework within which the trial proceeds,” and often are 
grounds for judges to order cases be retried to remove the presumption of un-
fairness injected by the error at issue.90 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
While many of the aforementioned cases are factually similar to McCoy, 




 82. United States v. Holman, 314 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 83. Id. at 840.  
 84. Id. at 844.  
 85. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
 86. Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 87. Id. at 382–83.  
 88. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946); see also FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 52(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2018).  
 89. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991).  
 90. Id. at 310. 
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before the trial and vehemently objected. 91  Conversely, in many of these other 
cases, attorneys acted at trial without their client’s consent, but the clients were 
never consulted or informed of the planned strategies ahead of time.  This ex-
press denial of consent makes McCoy’s case less like Holman, or Haynes and 
more like Carter or Cooke.  In distinguishing McCoy from some of these sim-
ilar cases without express denials of consent, the Court held “that a defendant 
has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when coun-
sel’s experience-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the 
best chance to avoid the death penalty.”92  Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion 
did not address some of the prejudicial issues raised in similar Sixth Amend-
ment cases because McCoy’s case was not reviewed for ineffective assistance 
of counsel.93 
Justice Alito’s dissent made three main arguments.94  First, he contended 
that English’s trial strategy did not actually surmount to a guilty plea.95  Alt-
hough English admitted McCoy shot the victims, he only admitted to the req-
uisite actus reus, and he went on to deny that McCoy had the requisite mens 
rea to be found culpable for murder.96 
Second, the dissent argued McCoy’s case did not meet the Court’s stated 
criteria for certiorari and should never have been heard.97  Emphasizing the 
incredibly rare and unusual nature of McCoy’s case, the dissent argued the 
many idiosyncrasies made the case unlikely to hold much relevance to future 
litigants, judges, or juries, and thereby should not have been granted certio-
rari.98 
Third, the dissent addressed issues related to a lack of prejudicial error 
review.99  Justice Alito suggested the majority opinion compounded its error in 
hearing the case in the first place when it affirmed the lower court’s finding of 
structural error, as he believed this topic was outside the realm of the certiorari 
grant.100  
  
 91. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1506 n.2 (2018). 
 92. Id. at 1505.  
 93. Id. at 1510–11. 
 94. Id. at 1512–18 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 1512 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 96. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 1512–15 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 1517–18 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).  Certiorari was specifically granted to determine 
“whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over the de-
fendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection.” Id. at 1507.  
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V.  COMMENT 
Perhaps the most glaring problem in this case is that the court allowed an 
incompetent attorney to defend a capital client.101  But, rather than remark on 
the many factual absurdities in the case, this comment will focus on the ethical 
and practical effects and shortcomings of the legal conclusions underlying the 
majority opinion.  This section will first highlight the ethical and philosophical 
assertions raised by this case.  Next, it will address the problems in practical 
application created by the Court’s majority opinion and suggest more stringent 
prerequisites before new trials can be awarded in cases like McCoy. 
A.  Welcoming State Aided Suicide  
Although Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion only makes one citation to 
Professor Erica Hashimoto’s 2010 article, “Resurrecting Autonomy: The 
Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control the Case,” Hashimoto might as well 
have written the entire opinion herself.102  In her critically acclaimed article, 
Hashimoto advocated for a reclassification of a “criminal defendant’s auton-
omy interest” to control his own defense from a “constitutional value” to a 
“constitutional right.”103  Hashimoto cautioned against proceedings like 
McCoy where “counsel has the authority to pursue a guilt-based defense at trial 
and to concede the defendant’s guilt of a lesser-included offense, even over the 
defendant’s objection” because of the criminal defendant’s lack of autonomy 
to manage his own case.104 
Hashimoto’s opponents operate under the foundational belief that “the 
optimal strategy for a defendant in a criminal case is one that minimizes both 
the risk that an innocent defendant will be found guilty and the sentence of the 
defendant in the event of a conviction.”105  Alternatively, Hashimoto argued 
the true optimal strategy for a defendant in a criminal case depends on how 
individual defendants define their own “best possible result.”106  She surmised 
that, for some capital defendants, “the possibility of an acquittal, even if re-
mote, may be more valuable than the difference between a life and a death 
  
 101. State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 545 (La. 2018).  McCoy’s attorney, Larry 
English, suffered depression and irreparable harm as a result of this case.  For an inter-
esting take on this case from English’s perspective, see Jeffery C. Mays, To Try to Save 
Client’s Life, a Lawyer Ignored His Wishes. Can He Do That?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/nyregion/mccoy-louisiana-lawyer-larry-
english.html [perma.cc/YK2M-ADPN]. 
 102. Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right 
to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1147 (2010). 
 103. Id. at 1152–60.  
 104. Id. at 1149–50.  
 105. Id. at 1174–75. 
 106. Id. at 1178–79. 
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sentence.”107  Because individual defendants determine for themselves what 
their own “best possible result” is, Hashimoto argued criminal defendants have 
a “significant autonomy interest in controlling the key decisions in the case.”108  
This sentiment was specifically cited in Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion as 
a reason for instituting an autonomy right for criminal defendants to control 
strategy decisions in their own defense.109 
An autonomy regime formulated by Hashimoto and enforced by Justice 
Ginsburg would ultimately provide grounds for “state aided suicide.”110  This 
phrase, originally coined by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Judge Thomas 
Pomeroy in 1978, refers to a scenario in which courts let capital defendants 
make strategic decisions, either adverse to their lawyer’s advice or when ap-
pearing pro se, that result in death penalty convictions.111  The theory is that, 
had defendants been required to follow their lawyer’s strategy advice, they 
could have escaped capital punishment.112 
A 2004 New Jersey Supreme Court case cites the fear of inducing “state 
aided suicide” as the motivation for rejecting Hashimoto and Justice Gins-
burg’s plea for criminal defendant autonomy rights.113  In State v. Reddish, the 
court warned against strengthening autonomy rights for capital defendants in 
acknowledging:  
An inadequate and incompetent presentation by a pro se defendant . . . 
unacceptably poses a risk to the State of executing a defendant whose 
individual character and record do not warrant the ultimate punishment 
. . . Honoring an incautious defendant’s choice to exercise his self-rep-
resentation right does not mean a court must fulfill his death wish.114 
While Hashimoto may qualify state aided suicide as a risk worth taking, 
the court in Reddish used this risk to advocate against an expansion of auton-
omy rights for criminal defendants.115 
A similar argument was proposed by Professor John F. Decker in his 1996 
article “The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assess-
ment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta.”116  
In his article, Decker examined the historical and legal regimes at play leading 
  
 107. Id. at 1178.  
 108. Id. at 1178–79. 
 109. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508–09 (2018). 
 110. Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 181 (Pa. 1978).   
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. State v. Reddish, 859 A.2d 1173, 1201 (N.J. 2004). 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An 
Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483 (1996). 
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to Faretta in 1976 and argued that the Court’s ruling in Faretta (that defense 
attorneys must abide by their clients’ wishes above anything else) lacked con-
stitutional basis.117  On the contrary, Decker highlighted the myriad procedural 
problems often caused by self-representation and concluded that “representing 
oneself is rarely, if ever, in the best interest of an accused.”118  Decker con-
cluded that Faretta was wrongly decided and should be overturned.119 
Decker’s argument that the procedural problems often presented by pro 
se representation in complex cases outweigh the ethical considerations of crim-
inal defendant autonomy rights is supported elsewhere in theory and in prac-
tice.  In United States v. Taylor, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision to appoint mandatory “standby 
counsel” to a defendant during a particular phase of trial even though the de-
fendant would have preferred alternative counsel.120  The court recognized the 
defendant’s limited autonomy rights under Faretta, but qualified, “this right of 
self-representation [does not] comprehend any correlative right to preclude the 
trial court from appointing counsel and authorizing him to participate in the 
trial over the accused’s objection in order to protect the public interest in the 
fairness and integrity of the proceedings.”121  Essentially, the court determined 
a general procedural interest in fairness and integrity in judicial processes was 
more valuable than ensuring pro se defendants retain complete autonomy over 
every step of their legal defense.122 
In the end, the ethical issues posed by this question are the same that Jus-
tice Blackmun considered in his dissenting opinion in Faretta.123  The debate 
forces a standoff between strengthening criminal defendants’ autonomy rights 
to protect defendants from the potential dangers of impure intentions by ap-
pointed counsel and trumpeting judicial norms of fairness, integrity, and relia-
bility over occasional oddball outlier cases and defendants.  It is a question of 
utility versus individualism: Does the judicial system exist to provide the great-
est amount of good for the greatest amount of people or does it seek to avoid 
individual injustices at any cost?  While the constitutional and overarching le-
gal answers (including Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in McCoy) tend to-
wards the latter, there are well-documented arguments and support for the for-
mer as well.  In a progressing age of expanded access to knowledge and infor-
mation, the future legal community will likely continue siding with the major-
ity opinion’s rationales in McCoy, but an ideal solution would be a more bal-
anced regime that gives judges more leeway in answering these difficult ethical 
  
 117. Id. at 490–98.  
 118. Id. at 490.  
 119. Id.  
 120. United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448, 450 (7th Cir. 1978).  The “alternative 
counsel” the defendant sought in this case was a friend who was not a licensed attorney 
and had no formal legal training or experience. Id.  
 121. Id. at 452.  
 122. See id.  
 123. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 846–52 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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questions on a case-by-case basis.124  If we trust judges enough to let them 
make ultimate life or death sentencing decisions, we should also trust them 
enough to recognize instances when abnormally behaving pro se defendants, 
like Robert McCoy, could better achieve their desired results if provided with 
stronger legal guidance.125 
B.  Structural Error Review 
Because the Court in McCoy determined the Sixth Amendment violations 
were structural error, the case was not subject to harmless-error review.126  In 
attorney misconduct cases, like Holman and Haynes, the Sixth Amendment 
violations did not result in new trials for the defendants because the courts, 
using harmless-error review, determined the defendants were not prejudiced by 
their attorneys’ misconduct.127  The proceedings in those cases would have 
reached the same conclusions regardless of the attorneys’ behavior.  Although 
the same can certainly be said for McCoy, the Court granted him a new trial 
because the Sixth Amendment violations constituted structural error, which 
cast aside the need to conduct harmless-error review.128 
This absurdity undergirds Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion and frustrates 
those who advocate for a smoother and more streamlined judicial system.129  
Given the almost literal smoking gun evidence that linked McCoy to the triple 
homicide, the Court was forced to grant him a new trial because of its steadfast 
  
 124. One issue courts have faced in the aftermath of McCoy is whether their rulings 
hold true in circumstances where criminal defendants oppose their lawyer’s plea deci-
sions but fail to lodge their complaints in open court. See Supreme Court Rejects Rogue 
Lawyer Appeal in Texas Death Case (1), BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/supreme-court-rejects-rogue-lawyer-ap-
peal-in-texas-death-case-1 [perma.cc/S2B3-QLN8]. 
 125. Some would consider such a regime as one “where lawyers decide what is best 
for clients and ignore their wishes – where, in effect, a defense lawyer acts as judge and 
jury.”  See Garrett Epps, Can a Lawyer Declare His Client Guilty?, THE ATLANTIC 
(May 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/should-lawyers-
ever-force-their-clients-to-act-in-their-best-interest/560498/ [perma.cc/7UM9-F5U2].  
To circumvent these fears, significant protections would have to be put in place to en-
sure that judges retain authority to monitor the scope, responsibilities, and activities at 
play within the attorney-client relationship. Id.  
 126. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1511 (2018). 
 127. Id. at 1510–11; United States v. Holman, 314 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 380–81 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 128. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. at 1510–11. 
 129. See The Fascinating, and Lousy, Supreme Court Decision in McCoy v. Loui-
siana, THE HAYRIDE (May 14, 2018), https://thehayride.com/2018/05/the-fascinating-
and-lousy-supreme-court-decision-in-mccoy-v-louisiana/ [perma.cc/P5MS-U3ZV] 
(“We’ll now have a new trial with the same impossible-to-contest facts, and the same 
guilty verdicts, and probably some new flimsy appeal.  And untold amounts of money 
will be spent denying justice for the family of the victims.”). 
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policies of structural error.130  While some, like Hashimoto, praise Justice Gins-
burg’s majority opinion because “[i]t recognizes that what happened to McCoy 
was just so fundamentally unfair that he has to be given a new trial,” the fact 
remains that McCoy will be found guilty whether represented pro se, by Clar-
ence Darrow or even Bugs Bunny.131  Meanwhile, the State must spend re-
sources retrying the case, the court must pay judges, juries, and staff to rehear 
the case, and, most importantly, plenty of other litigants face lengthier delays 
in their own proceedings because of the tremendous expenses, in both time and 
money, associated with granting a new trial in this case.  Allowing new trials 
in instances of structural error further delays the entire judicial process and 
contributes to growing problems associated with judicial inefficiency and man-
datory review policies. 
If McCoy’s Sixth Amendment violations were subject to harmless-error 
review, the Court likely would have determined English’s conduct did not prej-
udice McCoy, and the case could have produced a more well-reasoned opinion 
without the frustration of forcing everyone to endure a new trial that will inev-
itably end with yet another guilty verdict.  The unfortunate ending in this odd 
case should serve as a call to action for judges and policymakers to reconsider 
the classification of structural error in order to better serve judicial expediency 
in the future. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Since Faretta, courts have largely upheld criminal defendants’ autonomy 
rights when asked to ward off lawyers who overstep their duties.  The Court’s 
decision in McCoy follows this line of thinking, as it praises the American ideal 
that a criminal defendant has the authority to make fundamental legal decisions 
in mounting his own defense no matter how ill-advised or unwise his decisions 
may be.  However, judges and scholars are not unanimous in praising the result 
of McCoy.  A vibrant minority questions whether the judicial system and soci-
ety at large would be better off if judges and attorneys had more leeway to 
advise and instruct criminal defendants when making legal decisions of para-
mount importance.  The interplay between Justice Ginsburg’s idyllic majority 
opinion and Justice Alito’s biting dissent exude the competing viewpoints in 
this ongoing legal discussion, and it is yet to be seen if future courts will likely 
look back at McCoy as a harbinger of more autonomy-laden rhetoric or as a 
catalyst for reconsidering longstanding ethical and judicial norms. 
  
  
 130. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. at 1511. 
 131. Mark Joseph Stern, Justice Ginsburg’s Groundbreaking Opinion in McCoy 
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